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The Rashayida Arabs vs. the State: The Impact of European Colonialism on a Small-Scale Society in Sudan and Eritrea

William C Young. Journal of Colonialism & Colonial History. Baltimore: Fall 2008. Vol. 9

 Abstract (Summary)

 

        Country-wide economic changes, the growth of nationalist movements and other political trends, and the tensions between military and political forces are all carefully described at the macroscopic, national level. Yet colonialism has an impact on the microscopic levels of family, village, and tribe as well. Anthropologists, who excel at producing extremely detailed accounts of local political and economic systems, can provide much information about the microscopic level but only for a relatively short period. To see how colonialism affects the local level over a long term, we must combine the data and methods of historians with those of anthropologists and other social scientists. This paper represents an attempt to apply these methods to a particular case: that of the Rashayida Arabs during the colonial period in Sudan and Eritrea (1866-1993).Studies of European colonialism in Africa often focus on the> transformation of large-scale institutions during and after the colonial period. Country-wide economic changes, the growth of nationalist movements and other political trends, and the tensions between military and political forces are all carefully described at the macroscopic, national level. Yet colonialism has an impact on the microscopic levels of family, village, and tribe as well. Historians often find it difficult to document the effects of colonialism at a microscopic level, however. Small social formations such as villages and tribes rarely produce the detailed written records needed by historians to reconstruct social transformations. Anthropologists, who excel at producing extremely detailed accounts of local political and economic systems, can provide much information about the microscopic level but only for a relatively short period. To see how colonialism affects the local level over a long term, we must combine the data and methods of historians with those of anthropologists and other social scientists. This paper represents an attempt to apply these methods to a particular case: that of the Rashayida Arabs during the colonial period in Sudan and Eritrea (1866-1993). It complements the recent work by Gewald on the colonial reconstruction of "tribes" in western Eritrea, slightly to the west of the areas discussed in this paper, during the 1940s.

            The Rashayida of Eritrea and Sudan are descended from Arabic-speaking Bedouin who migrated from a variety of locations on the Arabian side of the Red Sea in the late 1860s and settled in what is now Sudan and Eritrea. The Rashayida are not numerous. It is estimated that there
were about 40,000 Rashayida in Sudan and probably fewer than that in Eritrea in 1980. Despite their small numbers, they have managed to preserve their de facto independence from both Eritrea and Sudan. Their current independence can only be understood in light of the history of the frontier zone between Sudan and Eritrea.

             At the time when the Rashayida reached the African coast of the Red Sea, it was contested by two empires: the Ottoman empire - represented locally by Egyptian forces - and the central Ethiopian state ruled by Emperor Tewodros (Theodore) II. The Egyptians wanted to expand the territory of neighboring Sudan, which they had invaded and conquered in 1821. They also wanted to strengthen their hold on the port cities of Sawakin and Massawa, which they had controlled on-and-off since 1811. Although the Red Sea coast was nominally under Ottoman administration from 1827 to 1865, the actual power there was often Egypt. Regardless, it was not until 1866 that the Ottomans ceded the two ports to the Egyptian government, and it was only then that Egypt felt free to develop them and integrate them more fully into the Egyptian economy. Egypt believed that the two ports would prosper after the completion of the Suez Canal, which was opened shortly afterward, in 1869. As for the Ethiopians, they were concerned that Ottoman and/or Egyptian control of the Red Sea coast would block Ethiopian trade with Britain and stifle economic expansion.

 

            Thus it must have seemed to the Rashayida, when they arrived on the scene in the late 1860s, that the two main forces that they would have to contend with were the Egyptians on the coast and the Ethiopians in the interior. Within twenty years, however, the situation changed completely. The coastal strip on which they had settled was divided between two colonial states: the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (with a garrison in Sawakin, to the north) and the Italian colony of Eritrea (with its headquarters in Massawa, to the south). At the same time, the revolt of the Mahdi and his followers against Egyptian rule in 1882 briefly transformed Sudan into a theocratic state with expansionist, messianic goals. Mahdist campaigns in eastern Sudan pushed the Rashayida out of the grazing lands that they had exploited for the twenty years after their first arrival and confined them to the coastal area along the Red Sea. As a result, the Rashayida found themselves in a frontier zone between two foreign powers. It was the competition between these two powers, more than the earlier struggle between the Ethiopians and Egyptians, which affected them most directly. To see why this was so, we need to know where the Rashayida were. The scattered references to the Rashayida in contemporary documents indicate that they sailed in small boats from coastal Arabian towns such as al-Muwaylih (27° 41' N, 35° 31' E) and Jidda and settled near Sawakin, Tokar (18° 19' N, 38° 0' E), 'Aqiq (18° 12' N, 38° 16° E), Marsa Barisa (17° 55' N, 38° 36' E), Wold Qan (17° 20' N, 38° 35' E) and Massawa/Mits'iwa. Thus their nomadic camps were scattered along the coast. Since they were nomadic pastoralists, they had to move frequently each year to find pasture for their livestock. Some moved north and south along the coast or moved up into the Eritrean highlands. Others moved deeper into Sudan. As we will see, still others stayed close to the Red Sea to take advantage of the shallow ports there and engage in commerce with Red Sea merchants. It was in their interest, then, to be able to move freely throughout the area, regardless of the efforts by colonial powers to divide it into separate zones of influence. Under these circumstances, the Rashayida sometimes came into conflict with colonial authorities. More frequently, they tried to avoid them and keep their distance from the administrations of both Eritrea and Sudan. The modern history of the Rashayida, therefore, is a history of the Sudanese-Eritrean frontier. From the Rashayida's perspective, the colonial era can be divided into four periods, each marked by the efforts of a particular national or colonial government to rule the areas where the Rashayida lived. These are: 1) the Egyptian period, 2) the Mahdist period, 3) the Colonial period; and 4) the post-WWII period.


The Egyptian Period

 

            In 1866 the port cities of Sawakin and Massawa had just been ceded to Egyptian control by the Ottoman Empire. These cities now became capitals of provinces bearing their names. The province of Massawa extended as far north as the village of Qarora (17° 41' N, 38° 22' E) which meant that the boundary between Massawa province and Sawakin province lay approximately where the modern-day border between Sudan and Eritrea lies. The Rashayida first settled in Sawakin province, near Tokar, but after a clash with members of the Hadendowa tribe they moved across the provincial boundary to the area south of Qarora. This area was populated by the Habab "tribe" (a social formation composed of Beit Asgadé noble lineages and their dependent Tigré-speaking serfs). They spent about five years in the territory of the Habab without difficulty, but in 1876 and 1878 conflicts between the two tribes broke out. The Egyptian governor of Massawa, 'Ala' al-Din Pasha, intervened. He fined the Habab tribe for breaking the peace but ordered the Rashayida to move back across the provincial border to Sawakin. They complied but returned to Massawa province a year later. As a result, 'Ala' al-Din Pasha deported some Rashayida, sending them back across the Red Sea to Arabia.

            By 1880 the Rashayida had returned, however, and had settled again near Sawakin. The continued to have problems with the Egyptian administrators; in 1881 the governor of Sawakin, 'Ali Rida Pasha, put some of them in prison. Soon after, however, the outbreak of the Mahdist wars in 1883 greatly weakened Egyptian rule of the area and altered relations between the government and the Rashayida. Mahdist troops besieged the Egyptian garrisons in al-Qallabat, Kassala, and Tokar at various times in 1883. In light of the Mahdist threat, the Egyptian forces in Sawakin - which were led by British commanders, since at this time Egypt had become a de facto colony of Britain - began to view the Rashayida as potential allies rather than as troublemakers. But the continuing attacks of the Mahdist armies soon forced the Rashayida to leave the vicinity of Sawakin and move south across the provincial boundary again into the Habab's territory.


 The Mahdist Period

            The first clashes between the Rashayida and the Mahdist armies probably occurred after the Mahdists besieged the towns of Tokar and Sawakin in November of 1883. At this time the Rashayida were on good terms with the British-led garrison in Sawakin and tried to resist the Mahdist forces. The British gave them no weapons or support, however, and so some of them tried to accommodate the Mahdist forces. There were a few nomadic families living farther inland, near the Sudanese town of Goz Rajab (16° 4' N, 35° 34' E), when this area came under Mahdist control in 1884, and they briefly declared their allegiance to the Mahdi. However, the bulk of the Rashayida stayed near the Red Sea Coast and continued to trade with the Anglo-Egyptian garrison in Sawakin and also in 'Aqiq. For this reason, the Mahdists attacked the Rashayida near Goz Rajab in July 1885. This caused the entire tribe to move to the Red Sea coast. Some remained in the vicinity of Tokar while others crossed the border into what had just recently become the Italian colony of Eritrea. These Rashayida became allies of one of the Bani 'Amir communities there - specifically, the Ad Aflenda "tribe" - and gradually re-established the political and commercial relations with the Habab "tribe" that they had initiated a decade earlier.

            From 1885 to 1900 political relations in this border area were quite complex. An Italian colonia force unexpectedly occupied the port of Massawa early in 1885 and for the next five years gradually expanded the territory under their control. During the same time Ethiopian armies crossed into Sudanese territory on many occasions to confront Mahdist forces. Ethiopian troops raided eastern Sudan in May 1885 and January 1887, and in response Mahdist armies attacked Ethiopian positions in January 1888 and March 1889. Throughout this period theRashayida and their Tigré-speaking neighbors had to decide whether to join the Mahdists, declare their allegiance to the Ethiopian empire, or seek the protection of the Italians. By October 1885 the Habab had become Italian clients,16 and presumably some Rashayida had, also. They continued to cooperate with the Italians for at least five years. The support of the Italians did not permit the Rashayida living in Eritrea to return to their pasture lands in Sudan, however. Mahdist forces were strong in eastern Sudan until late in 1888. In December of that year, a major battle between the Mahdists and the Anglo-Egyptian forces occurred near Sawakin. The Mahdists were defeated and the Mahdist general 'Uthman Diqna was forced to move his headquarters to Tokar, close to the Eritrean border, in February 1889. Some Rashayida were still living in Tokar at that time. When the Mahdist garrison there grew short of provisions, in February 1890, another Mahdist general, Muhammad 'Uthman Abu Qarja, decided to seize the Rashayida's livestock and use their animals to feed his troops. This happened during the beginning stages of a general famine in Sudan that was just making its appearance in Tokar. When the Rashayida camping near Tokar were ordered to surrender their livestock, they fled to Khor Balatat (17° 58' N, 38° 24' E), about 40 kilometers southeast of 'Aqiq. (See Map 1.) The Mahdists pursued them, killed 60 men, and seized 1,000 of their camels.

            For the next two months the Habab and their Rashayida allies fenced with the Mahdists encamped at Khor Balatat. Some of the Habab pretended to be interested in joining the Mahdist movement and tried to trick Abu Qarja and his troops into meeting them at Rahib (17 °; 29' N, 38° 43' E), where they planned to ambush him. He did not take the bait, however, and in May 1890 he returned to Tokar. The Mahdist army remained in Tokar until February 1891, when an Anglo-Egyptian force took the town and forced it to withdraw to Kassala.

           During this period, the Rashayida and Habab cooperated with each other commercially as well as militarily. They took part in the bi-directional trade in people and firearms that was of great economic and political importance in the Red Sea area at the time. In essence, it involved the exchange of slaves for weapons. People who had been captured by Mahdist armies and by slave dealers in southern Sudan and Ethiopia were brought to the Red Sea coast for sale there. Next, coastal merchants - based in Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Hijaz – would buy captives in the inland commercial center of Tokar, take them to the Habab's coastal town of Taklai (17° 34' N, 38° 51' E) and load them onto boats for transport across the Red Sea to Jidda, where they would be sold. For the return trip to Sudan, these merchants would buy firearms and sell them at a profit in eastern Sudanese and Ethiopian towns. There is evidence that the Habab and the Rashayida participated in the trade in people. Ad Azeri, Aflenda, and Hadendowa tribesmen would bring captives from the interior and sell them to the Rashayida, who were living on the Red Sea coast. The Rashayida, in turn, would take them across the Red Sea and sell them in Jidda. The Rashayida were especially useful business partners for the Habab in these ventures because they had relatives in the Hijaz and had experience in crossing the Red Sea in small craft called sanabik (singular sanbuk).

            The demand for firearms in Ethiopia and eastern Sudan was strong. Both the Mahdist garrison in Tokar and its Anglo-Egyptian and Ethiopian opponents wanted weapons. The hapless civilians in the frontier zone between Sudan and Ethiopia also needed weapons to defend themselves from these armies. Finally, weapons were useful for attracting allies and soldiers. To illustrate: in June 1889 the Italians in Massawa made a gift of 1000 rifles to the Habab tribe. The Habab, in turn, persuaded some of the Hadendowa tribesmen along the Sudanese-Ethiopian border to desert the Mahdist ranks by offering them some of these firearms.

            By the end of 1891 the intensity of the conflict along the Red Sea Coast had lessened. Tokar had been taken by Anglo-Egyptian forces and the path was open for some of the Rashayida to return there. Some Rashayida, in fact, made exploratory trips to Sawakin in January 1892, bringing livestock with them to sell. By July 1894 Italian forces had captured the city of Kassala from the Mahdists and the danger of the Mahdist armies for the Rashayida was greatly diminished if not completely ended. Now the main threat to their autonomy was the> escalating demand for taxes that the Italian colony of Eritrea was making.


 The Colonial Period

            The Italian colonial authorities in Eritrea first collected taxes from the Rashayida in the form of a nominal tribute in 1890, when "all of the principal Rashaida chiefs came to make an act of submission" to the Italian government of Eritrea. As one condition for accepting them as dependants of the colony of Eritrea, the Italians insisted that  they chose "as their representative a single chief." Although some of the Rashayida accepted the leadership of one such chief, Mubarak ibn Salim, many others did not and simply retreated to the frontier, out of reach of the tax authorities. In March 1891 the Italians tried t ”collect tribute" from the Rashayida and the Habab once again. I response, many Rashayida and some of their Habab allies crossed into Sudan in 1892 in order to escape Italian taxation. This created a problem for the British administrators. They did not want to encourage immigration by the Rashayida, fearing that it would antagonize their Italian counterparts in Eritrea. Yet because they were not formally in control of Sudan until 1898, when they overthrew the Mahdist state, they did not actively try to prevent the Rashayida from crossing the frontier.

            By 1895 the movements of nomadic tribesmen across the frontier into Sudan had caused real tension between the Italian and English administrations. On February 4, 1895, some 15,000 Habab tribesmen crossed over the frontier from Eritrea to Sudan. They did this after the Italians had announced their intention to conduct a census and impose heavier taxes on the tribe. The Habab also complained about the Italian's monthly requisitioning of camels. Soon after one of the leaders of the Rashayida, Mubarak ibn Salim, also crossed the frontier and declared to the British that he wanted to "defect." His motive was the same: to avoid paying tribute to the Italians.

            In response, the Italians sent out a patrol to pursue the Rashayida. The patrol managed to surprise them near Qarora on February 24, 1895. The Rashayida "...at once made to get away with their beasts, 2000 camels, 3000 goats whilst a hundred men armed with rifles and some with lances or sabers began an attack against Brigadiere's patrol, opening fire o them. Brigadiere [Guerra] in order to intimidate them first [had the patrol] fire in the air, but seeing that his adversary was attacking seriously he replied, putting it to flight after an hour's fighting, following which he had arrested the under chief Bachilalla Uold Salem [Bakhil Allah ibn Salim] and sequestered 200 camels, 108 goats and some weapons.

            In the evening the Zebu returned and again attacked the Brigadiere who succeeded a second time in putting them to flight, there remaining dead four Zebu; two prisoners were taken, one of whom died at Karora [Qarora]."

            In March 1895 the Italians again sent troops to the frontier town of Qarora, this time with the intention of punishing some Habab for crossing into Sudan. They were determined to keep the Habab and the Rashayida on the Italian side of the frontier. This caused the British to send a battalion to the nearby town of 'Aqiq to make certain that the Italian/Eritrean troops did not pursue the Habab and Rashayida into their own (British) zone of influence. Negotiations in 'Aqiq persuaded some of the Habab to return to Eritrea but some others chose to remain in Sudan. This incident led the British to decide that "the frontier ought to be delimited."

            On June 25, 1895 an agreement was reached by the Anglo-Egyptian and Italian colonial forces that "the semi-nomad tribes of the frontier area called Ad Azeri, Aflenda, Bet Mala and Rashaida and the clans of the Beni Amer that at present recognize the authority of Sheik Idris Ahmed are recognized to be dependants of the Egyptian government...[while] the other clans of the Beni Amer that at present acknowledge the authority of Sheik Al Hussein and of Mahmud Sherif, and the Habab are recognized as dependants of the Government of Eritrea." As can be seen from the wording of the agreement, the result was to separate the Rashayida from the Habab administratively (and separate the Bani 'Amir of Sudan from the Bani 'Amir of Eritrea, as well). Clearly this legal separation did not mirror the actual situation on the ground, since we know that many Rashayida remained in Eritrea with their Habab allies after 1895. Furthermore, the Rashayida continued to cross the frontier, going in both directions, for many years after this.

            During the next forty years of Anglo-Egyptian rule, the British administration in Sudan worked with the Italian colonial administration in Eritrea, trying to harmonize tax policies, tariffs, and police policies on both sides of the border. Their goal was to avoid creating economic and political pressures that might prompt the Rashayida - and the other nomads along the frontier - to move from one side to the other. The British hoped to transform the Sudanese-Ethiopian frontier zone into a more sharply demarcated and policed international border.

            As noted above, Italian taxation in Eritrea prompted many Rashayida to move into Sudan in the 1890s. Soon there were sufficient numbers of Rashayida in Sudan for the British to recognize them officially, appoint some of their leaders as "sheikhs," and give these leaders annual stipends. The British demoted and imprisoned one of them, Marshud Murayhim, in 1900 and replaced him with Mas'ud Salih, all of which indicates the presence of a good many Rashayida on the Sudanese side of the frontier, as well as a good degree of British involvement in the Rashayida's internal affairs. By 1906 there were many nomads in the area south of Tokar, and they were reported to be "prosperous." On the Italian/Eritrean side, the Baratikh "branch" of the tribe were said to be "in dependence on" the Italian administration and were known to reside near Marsa Gulbub (16° 23' N, 39° 10' E) and Rahib on the Red Sea coast. Their numbers were estimated at between 200 and 300 men "with about 200 camels and a few goats."
British taxation and British police actions, however, threatened to trigger a reverse movement of the Sudanese Rashayida back into Eritrea in the early 1920s. In 1922 the British tried to seize some of the unregistered arms that the Rashayida had by raiding some of their camps near Khor Ashat (18° 44' N, 37° 28' E). Because some of the Rashayida resisted, this police action was difficult for both sides and was remembered by British officials for many years. In the following year the British tried to force the nomads along the frontier to list all of their livestock as a prelude to collecting livestock taxes. In May 1923 some of the Hadendowa nomads resisted the police forces that had been sent to register their livestock, and "literally hundreds of head of cattle migrated to Eritrea immediately herd listing commenced - the tribes most represented in the flight are Hadendowa (Beiranab and Goreeb) and a few Beni Amer." The Rashayida were not involved in this particular incident, probably because, as camel breeders, they could avoid the livestock tax more easily than the Hadendowa cattle breeders. Because their camels could go for days without drinking, the Rashayida could keep them away from wells and police units more easily than the Hadendowa, who needed to keep their thirsty cattle close to water. In face of the Hadendowas' resistance, the British were forced to stop registering livestock and accept a token payment of livestock tribute instead of taxes. Thus one of the motives for moving back into Eritrea was removed. The British and Italians also had to coordinate their efforts to police the frontier and prevent conflicts among tribal groups in Sudan from spreading into Eritrea. In October 1927, for example, some of the Hadendowa of Kassala Province (in Sudan) carried out raids against the Labat branch of the Bani 'Amir pastoralists in Eritrea. To resolve the conflict the British and Italian administrators worked to convene a meeting at Sabderat (15° 26' N, 36° 40' E) between representatives of the two tribes concerned. Another case of British-Italian cooperation occurred in March and April 1931, when the British sent the Sudan Defense Force into Rashidi camps along the frontier in order to seize unregistered weapons. Before carrying out this operation, the Governor General of the Sudan telegraphed his Italian counterpart in Eritrea to ask for Italian help. The result was two coordinated raids on the Rashayida. The Sudan Defense Force seized ammunition and about 60 firearms from the Rashayida on the Sudanese side of the frontier, while the Italians seized " old muskets and some ammunition from Rashaida on the Eritrean side..." As a result of the raid on the Sudanese side of the border, 21 Sudanese Rashayida were sentenced to terms of imprisonment "totaling 37 ½ years..."

            This fraternal cooperation between the two colonial powers started to break down in 1935, however, as the extent of Italy's imperial ambitions in Africa became clear. Italian troops invaded Abyssinia from positions in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland in October 1935, and in response the British (along the other members of the League of Nations) imposed som economic sanctions on Eritrea. For example, the British prohibited the sale of transport animals to the Italians by Sudanese citizens. But because the sanctions did not include grain the British could not prevent Sudanese grain merchants from trading with Italy. This loophole created a brisk commerce in grain along the frontier. The Rashayida were involved indirectly, as suppliers of transport animals.

            The Italians sorely needed Sudanese grain for feeding their troops and their transport animals. Sudanese grain merchants brought their merchandise on camel back to the frontier town of Qarora, where Eritrean merchants bought it and loaded it onto Eritrean draught animals. At other locations where there were no police posts, some Sudanese tribesmen probably took their own camels across the frontier with the grain, I defiance of the sanctions. It is likely that some Sudanese Rashayida did so.

 We also know that some Eritrean Rashayida crossed the frontier into Sudan late in 1935. In October of that year the Italians tried to force some Rashayida to sell camels and donkeys to the Eritrean army at below their market price. The Italians needed the animals to help supply the troops being sent into Abyssinia. To avoid these forced sales, some 15 Rashidi families - belonging to the Baratikh "branch" of the tribe - fled to Sudan. Some low-ranking officers of the Italian border patrol asked a British administrator for help in returning these refugees to Eritrea. The reply was cool: he said "I could do nothing unless ordered to by the Governor [of Kassala province], and that, even then, as the Baratikh 'wisms'. [camel brands] are the same [in Sudan] as in Eritrea, and the Sudan sheikhs would certainly hide their brethren from Eritrea, I doubted the effectiveness of action. He must not blame the Sudan Government if (should Governor agree to such action) we cannot get his Rashaida back."

            The British tolerated Rashidi commerce with the Italians until July 1940, when Italian forces invaded and occupied Kassala and Italy was declared an enemy of Britain. After this the Rashayida were warned to stop trading with the Italians, and when these warnings were ignored the British told some sections of the Rashayida to move away from the frontier.42 No doubt the Rashayida needed no warning, because by September 1940 fighting between British and Italian troops in Kassala was raging, making the frontier zone a dangerous place for them. The fighting continued from September 1940 until April 1941, when the commander of Italian forces in Eritrea surrendered to the invading British.

            The Allied victory in Eritrea did not put an end to border problems, however. Although both Sudan and Eritrea were under British administration, they were still separate entities. This caused difficulties early in 1942, when some Bani 'Amir groups in Eritrea crossed the border to raid Hadendowa pastoralists in Sudan and seize their cattle. This incident sparked an inter-tribal conflict that continued on and off for three years. In 1950 the Rashayida themselves were involved in a conflict with the Hadendowa on the Eritrean-Sudanese frontier, near Ungwatiri (16° 55' N, 36° 03' E).44 Problems of this nature may have contributed to the formation of British policy about the Eritrean-Sudanese border during the post-WWII period.


 The Post-WWII Period in Eritrea
 

            For about ten years after the end of WWII, it seemed possible that the boundary between Sudan and Eritrea would be erased and all of the Rashayida would come under a single national administration. During this time, Britain favored the partition of Eritrea. They advocated amalgamating the northern and western parts of Eritrea with Sudan and proposed that the rest of Eritrea be absorbed by Ethiopia. This proposal was first formulated in 1943 by Stephen Longrigg, a British military administrator. If this proposal had been implemented, all of the Rashayida would have become citizens of Sudan.

            What happened instead was that the frontier between Eritrea and Sudan became an international border. In practice, this border has remained somewhat porous, so that the Rashayida of Sudan can sometimes cross into Eritrea with little difficulty. But in legal and political terms the Rashayida of Eritrea have become an officially-recognized Arabic-speaking "nationality" in the new, independent state of Eritrea, while the Rashayida of Sudan remained Sudanese citizens.

            The cultural process that transformed the Eritrean Rashayida into a "nationality" had its roots in British language policy between 1941 and 1952. During this period, the British promoted Tigrinya and Arabic as the languages of instruction in Eritrean schools, arguing that Tigrinya would serve the Christian Eritreans as a language of culture while Arabic would serve the Muslims. Both languages were used until about 1956, when the Ethiopian government began replacing them with Amharic. The imposition of Amharic in the schools created serious obstacles for students who were native speakers of Tigrinya or Tigré (who together comprise 80-90% of the Eritrean population). Despite its suppression of Arabic and its insistence on making Amharic the official language, the Ethiopian government made some efforts to court the Rashayida. The Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia referred to them as "the Rashaida ethnic minority in socialist Ethiopia" in 1986 and tried to win their loyalty by providing them with schools and medical facilities.

            The Eritrean nationalist reaction to Ethiopian policies ultimately led to Eritrean independence in 1991. But even before then, efforts were made to restore Tigrinya and Arabic as literary languages. By 1977 the Eritrean Liberation Front had taught all of its fighters to read and write in Tigrinya, and other nationalist organizations were publishing communiqués and news in both Arabic and Tigrinya. Once Eritrea became independent, both languages were adopted as de-facto working languages in education and journalism, although neither were "official" languages. Arabic was recognized as the literary language used by native speakers of Tigré, Afar, Nara, Bilin, Hidareb/Tu Bedawie, and Saho. Of course, it is both the native language and literary language  of the Eritrea Rashayida.

            In the Eritrean context, where the social elements that composed the "nation" were complex linguistic and "tribal" units, the Rashayida were most easily classified as one of nine "nationalities." Some actual groups do not fit easily into any of these nationalities. The Bani 'Amir "tribe," for instance, consists of a collection of Tigré-speaking vassal clans that were historically subordinate to Tu Bedawie-speaking noble clans. Both Tigré and Tu-Bedawie speakers among the Bani 'Amir, moreover, are increasingly becoming literate in Arabic.49 But in the Rashayida's case the match between Arabic-speech and tribal boundaries was exact; no members of the Rashayida tribe were native speakers of any language other than Arabic. Thus the Rashayida neatly filled the category of "Arab nationality" in the Eritrean scheme of things. They were granted official recognition as a "nationality" in 1993.

            During the same period, the frontier between Sudan and Eritrea has gradually "hardened" to become an international border. But this change has not bee continuous or straightforward. During the 1960s, when Ethiopia ruled Eritrea, the Sudanese-Ethiopian border was patrolled by Ethiopian troops. As revolts against Ethiopian rule accelerated, however, some of these patrols were withdrawn and the border became more porous. Many Eritreans crossed the border into Sudan as refugees during the 1970s and 1980s, and the Rashayida of Eritrea also crossed the border occasionally to visit their Sudanese relatives. Then, in the mid-1990s, a coalition of Sudanese opposition groups known as th National Democratic Alliance fled Sudan and established offices in Asmara. From 1996 to 2002 the NDA frequently crossed the border to attack Sudanese garrisons and towns. Some of the Sudanese Rashayida fled temporarily to Eritrea to avoid the fighting, and some of them may still be there.


 Conclusion

            As we can see, the modern history of the Rashayida is a history o border-crossings. Although not all Rashayida made such movements, enough of them did to maintain contacts with kinsmen across the border. What historical research makes clear is that the Eritrea-Sudanese border is a product of European colonialism and has no necessary connection with the economic and demographic geography of the region.

              When the Rashayida reached the western coast of the Red Sea in the 1860s, they chose to camp in the territories that best supported their economic interests. That is, they settled near the pastures that they needed for livestock breeding and the shallow coastal harbors that they needed for commerce. During the period of Egyptian rule, these territories were all under a single administration. But th  Anglo-Egyptian and Italian colonial administrations divided them in two. For this reason, the Rashayida had to continue with their economic pursuits in defiance of the colonial authorities. Later, after the colonial Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Italian Eritrea had become modern nation-states, the Rashayida had to decide whether to split into two societies - each with a different citizenship - or remain a single "tribe" with branches in two different countries. They opted to remain a single "tribe," and to do so continued to cross back and forth across the international boundary that nominally divides them between Sudan and Eritrea. They refuse to be co-opted or absorbed by the larger societies that surround them, and neither Sudan nor Eritrea has the political will or power to compel them to accept exclusive citizenship in either country.

 

Both the relative strength of the Rashayida's tribal identity and the relative weakness of the political institutions of Sudan and Eritre  are, no doubt, legacies of the colonial period. The historical trajectory of the Rashayida - and of Sudan and Eritrea - would have been much different if the only powers along the Red Sea coast during the past century had been Ethiopia and Egypt.
 

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